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typically involves six to twelve treatments given 
over a period of two to four weeks, the ability to 
learn new material is reduced and access to some 
memories that were formed prior to ECT is lost. 
Anterograde amnesia refers to the difficulty that 
patients have in remembering events that occur 
after treatment begins. This difficulty persists for 
m any weeks after treatment, gradually resolving 
as the capacity for new learning recovers. Retro­
grade amnesia, the loss of memories acquired 
prior to treatment, can initially involve memories 
acquired many years earlier. Access to these memo­
ries gradually recovers as time passes after treat­
ment. 
It should be emphasized that memory for the 
time period surrounding the treatment period itself 
does not recover after ECT. For example, when 
patients were asked three years after treatment 
to identify what past time periods they had diffi­
culty remembering, the average patient reported 
difficulty remembering the time during ECT, the 
two months after treatment, and the six months 
prior to treatment. Thus, except for this lacuna 
around the time of ECT, formal memory testing 
suggests that patients eventually recover their ca­
pacity for learning and memory. At the same time, 
absence of evidence for a lasting memory problem 
is not the same as proving that no such problem 
exists. It is possible that more sensitive tests could 
be developed that would detect persisting impair­
ment. It is always difficult to prove that something 
does not exist. However, memory tests sensitive 
enough to show differences between the memory 
abilities of healthy forty-year-olds and healthy fifty­
year-olds (some decline in memory ability does 
occur with normal aging) do not detect lasting 
mem ory problems in patients who have received 
ECT. 
. In contrast with the findings from memory tests, It . is noteworthy that some patients do report, even 
lo
�g after ECT, that their memory is not as good 
as 
�
t used to be. Although it is possible that the 
patients have a degree of sensitivity about their own memory problems beyond what can be de­tected by memory tests, there are a number of 
Other p ossibilities. One possibility is that, having recovered gradually from a period of rather severe a�ct easily documented memory impairment, it is 
�ifiicuit for a person to know when memory abili­ties have recovered to what they should be. People 
�ho lead active lives use their memories many times each day to recall past events and previously acq · uired knowledge. It is commonplace for recall 
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to be incomplete or inaccurate, especially for infor­
mation that lies at the fringes of our stored knowl­
edge, such as information that was encountered 
only once or material that was not fully attended 
to when it was first encountered. Sometimes mem­
ory fails altogether. If someone has had ECT, how 
can he or she know whether any p articular failure 
of memory is normal or whether it might be due 
to ECT? To the extent that ECT does lead many 
patients to doubt the integrity of their own memo­
ries, it is p ossible that this effect of treatment could 
be attenuated or eliminated by sympathetic and 
informed counseling during the period immedi­
ately following ECT. 
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EMOTION, MOOD, AND MEMORY 
The ways in which we attend, learn, and remember 
are related to our transitory moods and to our 
enduring emotional states. This assertion is based 
on research performed by experimental and clini­
cal psychologists who use a variety of methods. 
In some studies, psychologists measure differences 
in emotional states and determine whether those 
differences are associated with differences in the 
ways that the participants p erform cognitive tasks. 
These studies usually focus on unpleasant emotions 
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and moods, such as depression and anxiety. In 
other studies, psychologists attempt to induce ei­
ther unpleasant or pleasant moods in the partici­
pants (perhaps by having them listen to different 
types of music) and then examine how perfor­
mance is affected by these manipulations. Both 
types of research have tried to answer three major 
questions about the interaction of mood and mem­
ory: (a) Do depressed and anxious moods hinder 
performance on cognitive tasks? (b) Do people 
remember events that are emotionally consistent 
with their moods better than other events? ( c) 
Is performance improved if the same mood exists 
on the occasions of the original experience and 
the attempt to remember it? The ensuing summary 
suggests answers to the questions in the context 
of theoretical frameworks for understanding the 
relationships between mood and memory. 
Mood-Related Impairments in Learning and 
Memory 
Cognitive tasks vary according to the degree to 
which they require our attention. Some tasks re­
quire little attentional control for successful perfor­
mance; many of the cognitive processes involved 
in these tasks are relatively automatic, which means 
that they are well practiced and can occur simulta­
neously with other cognitive processes. Other 
tasks require a more effortful and deliberate focus 
of attention if good performance is to be achieved. 
The degree to which focused attention is required 
for good performance is a characteristic of tasks 
that are performed during initial exposure or learn­
ing and tasks that reveal memory for past events. 
Reading a long list of unrelated words for the first 
time, for example, requires little attentional con­
trol by fluent readers, but organizing them in ways 
that will be useful during later attempts to remem­
ber them clearly requires more effortful and delib­
erate focus. Similarly, tests of memory for those 
words vary in the degree of focused attention that 
they require. Rereading the same words is one 
index of memory (in that the old words can be 
read faster than new words) that involves pro­
cesses which are relatively automatic. In contrast, 
trying to recall the words on the list is a deliberate 
task that can benefit from a great deal of attention 
and the use of special strategies. (See also A TIENTION 
AND MEMORY. ) 
Separate assessments of learning and memory 
are not possible; any index of learning involves 
memory and vice vera. It is possible, however, 
to emphasize variations in one type of task by 
examining research in which the other type of 
task is held constant. When that is done, a pattern 
emerges: The learning and memory tasks that bene­
fit from attentional control are the tasks that pre­
sent difficulties to depressed and anxious people; 
they perform less well than people who are not 
mood-impaired. Weingartner and his colleagues 
( 1981 ), for example, discovered that clinically de­
pressed patients could learn lists of words orga­
nized into simple categories as well as could non­
depressed people, but when the same words were 
unorganized, the depressed patients learned less 
well. Similarly, college students who are experi­
mentally induced to feel depressed do not learn 
words presented in the context of more elaborate 
or distinctive sentences as well as do students in 
neutral moods, but the two groups perform simi­
larly when the contexts are less elaborate or dis­
tinctive (Ellis et al., 1984). Williams and his col­
leagues ( 1988) reviewed similar findings in the 
literature on anxiety and cognition. If people ap­
proach these types of learning tasks by providing 
their own organization (a deliberate strategy) or 
by focusing attention on elaborations and distinc­
tions, they learn at higher levels. Depressed and 
anxious people do not seem to attend in these 
ways. 
Similar conclusions can be reached in examining 
different types of memory tests. Hertel and Hardin 
( 1990 ), for example, found that depressed college 
students performed as well as nondepressed stu­
dents when the test did not involve attentional 
focus on a past event, but when the test required 
such focus, depressed students did not spontane­
ously use strategies for recognition that character­
ized the performance of the nondepressed stu­
dents. 
Why do mood-impaired people experience at­
tentional difficulties of the type just described? 
Some theoretical frameworks for understanding 
depression and anxiety emphasize capacity limita­
tions. Although the capacity to allocate attention 
is normally limited in human beings, depression 
and anxiety may impose further limitations. These 
further limitations may be biochemically induced, 
or they may be a reflection of mood-impaired peo­
ple's enduring concern with mood-related aspects 
of their experience-aspects that are often irrele-
vant to the task at hand. These task-irrelevant 
thoughts can distract attention when participants 
are left to their own devices (i.e., when they are 
told to learn a list of words). Yet when learning 
or memory tasks are devised in ways that constrain 
attention to materials or build in appropriate strate­
gies, mood-impaired people may perform as well 
as others (Hertel and Rude, 1991 ). 
Mood-Congruent Memory 
People pay attention to and subsequently remem­
ber episodes and materials that are consistent (or 
congruent) with their moods more often than they 
attend to and remember other occurrences. Mood­
congruent attention characterizes the performance 
of anxious people in particular. To the extent that 
anxiety is similar to a more general state of physio­
logical arousal (or alertness), attention to threat­
related events can be understood from an evolu­
tionary perspective. Research conducted by Ey­
senck et al. ( 1987) illustrates anxiety-congruent 
attention. In that experiment anxious participants, 
more often than nonanxious participants, spelled 
spoken homophones (such as die/ dye) to coincide 
with the more threatening concept. The results 
of another experiment by Mathews et al. ( 1989) 
showed similar mood-congruent attention on a test 
of memory. In this test, the participants were 
shown the first three letters of words and asked 
to complete them to form the first word that came 
to mind. The anxious subjects completed the stems 
?
f threat-related words that they had encountered 
tn an earlier task more often than other types of 
old and new words; nonanxious subjects did not 
show this bias. 
On more traditional tests of memory, such as 
tests of deliberate recall, anxious people do not 
always remember anxiety-related episodes better 
than other episodes (see Williams et al., 1988, 
for a review and possible explanation). Yet re­
search concerned with other emotional states (in­
cluding depression, happiness, and anger) shows 
more consistent evidence of mood-congruent re­
call. Separate investigations by many researchers 
have revealed mood-congruent recall of personal 
ev
�nts from the participants' past, as well as ma­
tertals provided in experimental settings. For de­
pressed people, these findings are consistent with 
explanations of their poor performance on typi-
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cally neutral tasks. If the conditions of the task 
permit it, depressed people focus on aspects of 
experience that are relevant to their emotional 
states; if those emotional aspects are tapped by 
the test, they are well remembered, but if they 
are not, performance on the mood-incongruent 
aspects suffers because the latter received less at­
tention. 
Some theorists understand mood-congruent re­
call by constructing models of the mind, or internal 
representations of experience. Bower's ( 1981) 
network model of mood and memory, for example, 
represents emotional states as nodes that are con­
nected to representations of events experienced 
in their context. A simple analogy can be achieved 
by thinking about nodes as hubs of wheels; spokes 
for one hub connect at the other end to other 
hubs and form a "Tinkertoy" network of inter­
connected nodes. When a mood is felt, the corre­
sponding emotion node is activated, and that acti­
vation spreads along the preestablished pathways 
(spokes) to representations of mood-congruent ex­
periences (such as adjectives with similar emo­
tional tone). In this way, mood-congruent informa­
tion is brought to mind (activated) at the time 
of a recall test. 
The phenomena of mood-congruent memory 
and their interpretation are qualified by a number 
of considerations (Blaney, 1986 ). For example, de­
pressed moods are often associated with a reduc­
tion in the recall of positively toned events rather 
than with increased recall of negative events. Isen 
( 1984) interpreted these findings and other asym­
metries to mean that attempts at mood control 
inhibit the recall of sad events. However, to the 
extent that mood-congruent memory is observed, 
it plays an important role in maintaining emotional 
states (see Teasdale, 1983 ). 
Mood-Dependent Memory 
Is there evidence of better memory when one's 
mood at the time of remembering is the same as 
one's mood during the original encounter? Initial 
research on this topic supported this claim for 
mood-dependent memory. Mood dependency and 
mood congruency have much in common in theory 
(as in Bower's network model) and in practice: 
Remembering mood-congruent events is often a 
matter of being in the same mood as when those 
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events were encountered previously. Recent re­
search, however, has frequently failed to produce 
evidence for mood dependency when mood con­
gruency is not involved-when the materials are 
not inherently related to the mood. Bower and 
Mayer ( 1989) concluded that this type of mood 
dependency occurs only when other aspects of 
the context for remembering do not provide strong 
cues for recalling the material. In other words, a 
consistent emotional state by itself is a weak basis 
for retrieving memories of past experience (see 
Eich and Metcalfe, 1989). Moreover, researchers 
sometimes ignore possible differences in arousal 
on the two occasions of learning and remembering 
(Revelle and Loftus, 1990); because physiological 
arousal mediates attentional processes, differences 
in arousal might conceal regularities in mood­
dependent memory. 
Summary 
Individual differences in emotional states and tran­
sitory moods correspond to differences in learning 
and remembering. To date, research findings are 
consistent with a theoretical framework that em­
phasizes attentional processes: Attentional deficits 
or attentional biases toward mood-related aspects 
of experience are possible sources for difficulties 
in remembering emotionally irrelevant events. 
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Episodic memory is the form of memory that allows 
an individual to recollect happenings from his or 
her past. It is sometimes referred to as autobio­
graphical memory. 
The concept of episodic memory has undergone 
considerable changes since its introduction by 
Tulving in 1972, and is now used in different senses 
by different writers and in different contexts. The 
two principal meanings are ( 1) episodic memory 
as a type of memory task and memory performance, 
and (2) episodic memory as a distinct neurocogni­
tive system. These two principal senses of the term 
are discussed here. 
Episodic Memory Tasks 
�pisodic memory in the first sense manifests itself 
�
n situations in which a person remembers some 
information acquired on a particular occasion. Al­
though episodic memory experiments have been 
concerned with a large variety of different kinds 
of information-words names faces, pictures, 
f: ' ' . acts, sentences, paragraphs, stories, and the like-
m
�
ch of the basic knowledge we have gained about 
episodic memory comes from various list learning 
experiments in which the to-be-remembered items 
are familiar words, and in which the acquired in­
formation concerns the appearance of particular 
Words in particular lists. 
The use of words in episodic memory experi­
ments is a matter of convenience: Words them­selves are of no more intrinsic interest to the 
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students of memory than fruit flies are to the sci­
entists investigating the mechanisms of heredity. 
Many facts and phenomena of memory that have 
emerged from resear.ch with lists of words also 
hold for other types of information and materials. 
Words represent convenient units of to-be-remem­
bered information, because the appearance of each 
word in a list is an event with well-defined temporal 
and spatial boundaries. Such an event is readily 
perceived and can be readily described by the 
learner. Also helpful is the fact that words have 
numerous and varied properties, many of which 
are systematically related to the words' memorabil­
ity. 
A prototypical laboratory experiment on epi­
sodic memory consists of ( 1 ) an original study 
experience during which individual items, such 
as words, are encoded and stored by the learner, 
and ( 2) a subsequent test during which some as­
pect of the experience is retrieved Tests of differ­
ent aspects of the original experience define differ­
ent episodic memory tasks. (These tasks can also 
be referred to as explicit memory tasks.) They 
include but are not limited to the following (see 
also MEASUREMENT OF MEMORY): 
1. Free recall task-Name the items in the study 
set or list, regardless of their order. 
2. Serial recall, or serial reproduction, task­
Name the items in the list in their proper 
order. 
3. Paired-associate task-Name the item that ap­
peared together with Item X. 
4. Cued recall task-Name the item in the study 
list that represented an instance of Category 
C (or one that rhymes with Word W, or fits 
into the sentence frame S). 
5. Free-choice (or Yes/No) recognition task­
Did Item X appear in the study set? 
6. Two-alternative forced-choice recognition 
task-Which of these two items, X or Y, ap­
peared in the study set? 
7. (Absolute) Frequency estimation task-How 
many times did item I occur in the study 
list? 
8. (Relative) Recency judgment task-Which 
of these two items, X or Y, appeared earlier 
(or later) in the study list? 
Each of these tasks can be described in terms 
of the subject's earlier personal experience. This 
is why they are classified as episodic memory tasks. 
